BUSINESS WATCH

Nebraska Employment At-Will Rule Eroded

By Robert T. Cannella (continued)

 

* * *. An employee's subjective understanding of job security is insufficient to establish an implied contract of employment to that effect * * *, and the record here does not establish sufficient evidence to conclude that any employee of Beatrice intended to offer a contract of employment on terms other than employment at will.”

 

It is worth repeating that, according to the Supreme Court’s opinion, Blinn’s breach of contract claim was based solely on the administrator’s “we’ve got at least five more years of work to do” statement. That statement was not sufficiently definite to form the basis of an enforceable contract.

 

To that point in the court’s opinion, the employment-at-will rule was alive and well and in full vigor. The Beatrice hospital had not breached any employment contract by discharging Blinn. However, the Supreme Court went on to hold that Blinn did have a “promissory estoppel” claim on which he was entitled to a jury decision. The crux of this holding was:

 

“Recovery on a theory of promissory estoppel is based upon the principle that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of a promise. * * *. Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a promise which the [maker] should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. * * *.

 

Under Nebraska law, the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not require that the promise giving rise to the cause of action must meet the requirements of an offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the [recipient].  * * *. Simply stated, there is no requirement of "definiteness" in an action based upon promissory estoppel. * * *. Instead of requiring reasonable definiteness, promissory estoppel requires only that reliance be reasonable and foreseeable.        * * *.

 

* * *. While the statements allegedly made by Blinn's superiors were insufficiently definite to offer a contract of employment on terms other than employment at will, there is [an issue for a jury to decide] as to whether Blinn was promised terms of employment that could reasonably have been expected to induce Blinn to forgo the job opportunity in Kansas of which he had informed Beatrice. * * *.

 

* * *. Because promissory estoppel does not require definiteness, an employer need not intend to contractually modify an employee's at-will employment in order for an employee to reasonably and foreseeably believe that his or her terms of employment have been changed and, therefore, act in reliance on that belief. Here, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Beatrice intended to offer Blinn a unilateral contract. But there is sufficient evidence, if believed by the [jury], to conclude that Blinn reasonably and foreseeably relied on Beatrice's assurances of a fixed term of employment, and Beatrice breached that promise. * * *.”

 

Thus, formation of an enforceable employment contract requires an “offer definite in form which is communicated to the employee, and the offer must be accepted and consideration furnished for its enforceability.” But even an indefinite promise will be sufficient to entitle an at-will employee to damages via the doctrine of promissory estoppel if the employer breaches an assurance on which the employee reasonably, foreseeably and detrimentally relies, even if the employer does not intend to make a contract and even if the employer does not intend to be bound by the assurance.

 

 

Continued

 

 

 

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